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I. THE CHILDREN ATTEMPT TO PREJUDICE THE COURT 
AGAINST BARBARA. 
Susan Brooke Mageras and Allyson Drew Uzelac (the "Children") have cited 
numerous facts and misstatements of facts1 in their brief that have no relevance to the 
issues before the Court. Among other allegations, the Children cite out of context: (i) 
unrelated proceedings below, ultimately falsely claiming that Barbara B. Uzelac 
("Barbara") lost all of those matters; (ii) the number of attorneys that have appeared for 
Barbara in this matter; (iii) that Barbara was sanctioned; (iv) how Louis and Barbara 
handled their finances during their marriage; (v) Barbara's win/loss record on her first 
appeal (inaccurately); and (vi) without citation to record evidence, the amount the estate 
allegedly paid defending Barbara's claims (more than $200,000.00). "Brief of 
Intervenors/Cross Appellants" ("Children's Brief) at 7-9, 27-30, 27 Fn.18, 30, Fn.20. 
From these and similar allegations, the Children argue that Barbara "forced" the estate to 
pay these legal fees. Id. at 30. They allege that Barbara is trying "to reach back four (4) 
years and into her deceased husbandfs premarital property to pay a devise she could have 
received in 1999." Id. at 12. There is no evidence that Barbara was offered any 
1
 See, e.g., Children's Brief at 15 (Claiming Barbara asserted her status as a 
creditor for the first five years of the litigation); compare T. 1, 12, 130 (Personal 
representative's counsel stated, in the presence of the Children and their counsel and 
without correction or objection: "The facts will show that the idea of [Barbara] being a 
creditor was raised for the first time three months ago, in July of 2003; two-and-a-half 
years too late"). 
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settlement, much less $230,660.90, in 1999.2 In the final analysis, the Children have 
made no argument that directly uses these and similar allegations in support of the legal 
principles involved in this appeal. 
In their "(Errata) Intervenors' Brief on Remand" (the "Children's Remand Brief), 
the Children called Barbara "the proverbial raccoon with her hand in the cookie jar." Id. 
at 10; R. 1588. Irrelevant, pejorative, personal attacks have no place in arguments before 
this Court. Nonetheless, those attacks have been made. 
Accordingly, Barbara responds: (i) She knew Louis for twenty-eight years before 
their marriage; (ii) During that twenty-eight-year period, she was a good friend of Louis' 
first wife through their twice monthly bridge club meetings; (iii) Through the bridge 
club's annual Christmas parties and other socials, she and Louis became friends; (iv) 
After their respective spouses died in the early 1970?s, Louis and Barbara were married in 
April 1976; (v) Barbara and Louis were happily married for more than twenty-three years 
until Louis' death in November 1999; and (vi) the Children have received both their 
devise and Barbara's in 2003. R.1413; October 7, 2003 Trial Transcript at 18-21 
(hereafter "T."); Trial Exh. 2 at 1; Trial Exhibit 21. 
Barbara has pursued this litigation because Louis wanted her to receive 
$230,660.90 upon his death, Barbara did not receive it, and Barbara wants and needs this 
2
 The Children's calculation of the amount of cash available to pay Barbara, even 
after the sale of the adjacent lot, was less than Barbara's devise unless the homestead had 
been sold. Id. at 26-27. 
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money. The personal representative (Louis' brother and uncle of the Children, T. 110) 
and now the Children have fought ever issue with tenacity to deprive Barbara of the 
benefits Louis intended for her. Indeed, allegedly spending over $200,000 to fight a devisee 
is tenacious, improvident, and a breach of the personal representative's duty of loyalty and 
impartiality. Utah Code §75-3-703; §75-7-802; §75-7-803. 
Barbara will be eighty-one years old on July 17. T. at 91. By the time this matter 
is remanded to the lower court, she will have lost approximately eight years of a more 
peaceful and comfortable life. Even in victory, Barbara is already a loser. Barbara asks 
the Court not to be swayed by the Children's emotional appeal; she is not, and never has 
been, a "raccoon with her hand in the cookie jar." 
II. BARBARA IS A GENERAL PECUNIARY DEVISEE. 
A. Whether Barbara Did or Did Not Receive a General Devise Chargeable 
to Specific Property Is Irrelevant; The Issue Remains: Was the Devise 
Pecuniary? 
In responding to Barbara's arguments that she is a general pecuniary devisee, the 
Children do not address the substance of Barbara's analysis. Brief of Appellant 
("Barbara's Brief) at 17-19. Instead, they claim for the first time on appeal3 that 
Barbara's devise is "a general devise chargeable to specific property." Children's Brief at 
13-15; compare Children's Remand Brief at 7-9, R.1585-87. But even had the Children 
3
 Determining whether or not the Children raised their issues on appeal with the 
lower court required a careful review of their Remand Brief, because the Children never 
cite to the Record showing where their issues had been preserved for appeal. 
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raised this issue on remand, the Children's analysis does not affect the issue of whether 
Barbara's devise is a general pecuniary devise or a general devise. Assuming Barbara's 
devise was a general devise chargeable to specific property, since the property identified 
by the Children as the designated source of the devise is no longer available to pay 
Barbara, the devise would be treated as a general devise in any event. Ulah Code §75-3-
902(1) (text following (l)(d)). Even under the Children's interpretation, the issue 
remains: is Barbara's devise a general pecuniary devise? A general devise chargeable to 
specific property can be a general pecuniary devise if the property has been lost or 
dissipated. For example, Comment c to the Restatement identifies a devise of "$1,000 
payable from my bank account" as a general devise charged to specific property. See 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 5.1 (1999), Comment c. If the 
bank account were closed at the decedent's death, the devisee receives a general 
pecuniary devise. 
To resolve whether or not Barbara is a general pecuniary devisee does not require 
a contorted analysis of the Antenuptial Agreement and the Will. Children's Brief at 13-
16, 28-30. It does not require the Court to add words to the Antenuptial Agreement or the 
Will. Id. Rather the issue is: What is the result of Louis' decision to incorporate by 
reference the Antenuptial Agreement into his Will? Trial Exh. 4 at 1; Utah Code §75-2-
510. If, as a result of Louis' decision to incorporate the Antenuptial Agreement into his 
will, Barbara receives a specific amount of money, then Louis' decision makes Barbara a 
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general pecuniary devisee. Even the Children would have to agree that $230,660.90 is a 
pecuniary amount. Children's Brief at 14. That is precisely what has happened here and 
that is why Barbara is a general pecuniary devisee. 
B. The Calculation of Barbara's Devise after Louis' Date of Death Does 
Not Change the Character of the General Pecuniary Devise. 
The Children also claim: "Obviously, interest is not properly assessed on monetary 
devises if the amount cannot be ascertained until the net probate estate is determined and 
all claims are paid." Id. Were this true, it would be a shock to estate planners who use 
"pecuniary formula" provisions in wills and trusts to maximize estate tax savings. See 
generally, Richard V. Covey, "The Marital Deduction and the Use of Formula 
Provisions," Bobbs-Merrill (2nd Ed. 1978).4 The "pecuniary formula" computes the 
pecuniary amount based upon laws, facts, and circumstances in existence at the time of 
the decedent's death. Because the calculation is generally made as part of the preparation 
of the estate tax return, it usually takes from six to fifteen months before the pecuniary 
amount is set.5 Nonetheless, these pecuniary formulas are general pecuniary devises. As 
stated in the Comment to the Restatement: 
A pecuniary devise can state a sum of money or state a formula from which 
a sum of money is derived. A pecuniary amount derived by formula is often 
4
 In 1978, Mr. Covey referred to pecuniary formula provisions as "true legacies." 
See Id. at 20-23. 
5
 Six months is the final date for calculating values based on the alternate 
valuation date. 26 U.S.C.A. § 2032(a)(2). With one six month extension, fifteen months 
is normally the cut off date for filing the estate tax return. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6075(a). 
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used in tax clauses, such as a devise of "the smallest pecuniary amount that, 
if allowed as a federal estate tax marital deduction, would result in the least 
possible federal estate tax being payable by reason of my death," or a devise 
of "the largest pecuniary amount, if any, that will not increase the federal 
estate taxes payable by reason of my death." 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 5.1 (1999), Comment c. Thus, 
the calculation of Barbara's devise post death does not affect its status as a general 
pecuniary devise. 
C. Louis' Overall Purposes Show Barbara is a General Pecuniary Devisee. 
With regard to the beneficiary status of Barbara and the Children, both parties 
agree it "is a question of construction, on which the testator's overall purpose is relevant." 
Id, Comment g; Children's Brief at 15. The Children acknowledge that Louis intended 
Barbara to be a beneficiary of his Will, notwithstanding that he left to his Children "all of 
my property real, personal or mixed, share and share alike." Children's Brief at 29. 
However, in arguing that Louis did not intend Barbara to receive a general pecuniary 
devise, the Children inaccurately claim that Barbara "contracted away" her right to Louis' 
premarital property. In addition, they violate a fundamental principle of the law 
governing the interpretation of contracts and wills; they add words to the Antenuptial 
Agreement and the Will. 
1. As a Devisee, Barbara is Entitled to Payment from Louis' Estate. 
The Children argue: "Barbara contracted her right to Louis1 premarital property 
away in 1976." Children's Brief at 15. This claim permeates their Brief. See Id. at 12, 
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16, 18, 28-30. However, this claim is inaccurate, because Barbara is seeking her share as 
a devisee of Louis' Will. Paragraph one of the Antenuptial Agreement states: 
In the event of the termination of this marriage by death or otherwise all of 
the real, personal or mixed property owned by each party hereto prior to the 
marriage shall be the sole and separate property of him and her or their 
respective estates. 
Trial Exh. 1 at 2,1fl. When Louis died, his premarital property became part of his estate, 
exactly as required by the agreement. As a general pecuniary devisee (or a general 
devisee), Barbara has a claim to payment of her devise from the estate's assets, whether 
premarital or post marital. Utah Code §75-3-902(1). Nothing in the Antenuptial 
Agreement precludes Barbara's devise from being paid by premarital property from 
Louis' estate.6 
2. The Children Ask the Court to Change the Meaning of the 
Agreement by Adding the Word "Marital" to Paragraph 5. 
The Children argue that the devise to Barbara "per the terms of paragraph 5" of the 
Antenuptial Agreement was a devise of "marital property." Id at 13-16, 28-30. The 
Children's methodology mimics what the trial court did in its first decision. In re Estate 
ofUzelac, ffljl5-21, No. 20040356-CA, 114 P.3d 1164, 526 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 2005 UT 
App 234 (Utah App. 2005) (reversing trial court's addition of the word "together" after 
"all property . . . acquired by the parties"). Children's Brief at 28-30. 
6
 The trial court stated: "neither party had a claim to the other's pre-marital 
property." R.1750, ^[1. Barbara is not claiming against Louis' pre-marital property. 
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This is the first time the Children have alleged that paragraph five of the 
Antenuptial Agreement refers only to "marital property." See Children's Remand Brief at 
1-11, R. 1579-89. The Children want to limit the meaning of "all property . . . acquired" 
by adding the word "marital" before "property." The trial court attempted to limit the 
meaning of this phrase by adding the word "together" after "acquired." In the Court of 
Appeals decision, the trial court's addition of "together" was reversed because "all 
property . . . acquired by the parties" would include property of every type that could be 
acquired however acquired. Uzelac, supra, ^ 19. Had Louis or Barbara inherited assets 
during the marriage, that property would have fallen within "all property . , . acquired" 
during the marriage, even though under divorce law, inheritances are normally treated as 
"separate" property. Hall v. Hall 858P.2d 1018, 1023 (Utah App. 1993). Moreover, it is 
a cardinal principle of contract interpretation in Utah, that courts do not "add, ignore, or 
discard words in this process [of interpretation]." Mark Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corp., 548 
P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1976). Thus, the property described in paragraph five of the 
Antenuptial Agreement included all property of every kind, whether marital or separate. 
3. The Children Want to Change the meaning of the Will by 
Adding the Word "Separate." 
A devise of "all my property, real, mixed or personal" has been used for centuries 
to show the testator is leaving every property of every kind to the designated beneficiary. 
See e.g. Estate ofAshton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540, 541-43 (Utah App. 1990) (interpreting 
similar language to constitute a devise of the "entire estate . . . in fee simple"). It is not, 
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as the Children claim, a devise of only Louis' separate property. That result can only be 
reached by adding the word "separate" before properly, and that is not permitted in Utah. 
Auerbach v. Samuels, 9 Utah 2d 261, 266, 342 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1959) (requiring an 
unambiguous will to be interpreted from its "four corners"). 
Louis' choice of words in his Will discloses his overall purpose. Louis is 
presumed to have known the law and its effects on his Will and Codicil at the time he 
executed them. Wallich v. Wallick 10 Utah 2d 192, 195, 350 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1960) 
(in interpreting a will, the Court presumed the testator knew the provisions of the anti-
lapse statute and how it would impact his will.) Both the Will and the Codicil were 
prepared after the adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code in Utah in 1977. Thus, 
Louis is presumed to know that Barbara was entitled to be a creditor of the estate who 
would receive payment prior to any payment to any other beneficiary. Utah Code §75-3-
805(1) (1977) and §75-3-807(1977). In preparing his Will, Louis chose language that 
supports this conclusion. To the Children he stated: "I give, devise and bequeath . . . to 
my children . . . all of my property, real, mixed, and personal." Trial Exh. 4 at 1. But, to 
Barbara, he stated: "she is to receive per the terms of our anti [sic] nuptial agreement 
dated March 26, 1976 " Id. In addition, Louis is further presumed to know that if his 
personal representative delayed payment to Barbara beyond the statutory time limit, then 
Barbara would be entitled to interest at the legal rate on the amount to which she was 
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entitled that was not paid. Utah Code §75-3-806(4) (1977).7 Finding that Barbara is a 
general pecuniary devisee, entitled to interest at the legal rate, is consistent with Louis' 
presumed and actual intent. The only distinction between (i) Barbara's status as a 
general pecuniary devisee and (ii) what her status would have been as a creditor is the 
date interest payments begin. Compare Utah Code §75-3-806(4) (creditor claim) (1992) 
with §75-3-904 (general pecuniary devisee). 
Interest at the legal rate is granted because the person entitled to the payment has 
had to wait to receive payment. Barbara has waited close to seven and a half years to 
receive any payment, and will likely have to wait for another six to twelve months before 
she receives payment. Where the amount payable under Louis' will is a dollar amount, it 
is fair, reasonable, and legally correct to rule that Barbara is a general pecuniary devisee 
entitled to interest at the legal rate from December 7, 2000 "until payment" is made. Utah 
Code §75-3-904. 
III. THE CHILDREN ARE RESIDUARY BENEFICIARIES. 
Like Barbara's status as a beneficiary, Barbara and the Children agree that Louis' 
overall purpose is relevant to the beneficiary status of the Children, but they again disagree 
on what that purpose was. Whether the Children are residuary devisees or general 
devisees affects abatement; if the Children are residuary devisees only their devise will 
7
 In 1977, the statutory time limit was three months following the end of the 
publication notice period. In 1992, Section 75-3-806(4) was amended so that the 
statutory period ends six months following death. See Laws 1992, c. 179, § 8. 
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abate to pay Barbara's devise; if they are general devisees, Barbara's devise and the 
Children's devise will abate to pay Barbara's devise. Utah Code §75-3-902(1). 
The Children chose not to respond to Barbara's analysis with regard to what would 
happen if there were no residuary devisee and a devise were to lapse. Barbara's Brief at 
21-22. Because Louis is presumed to know the law, Wallich, 10 Utah 2d at 195, 350 P.2d 
at 616, he logically intended his devise of "all of my property" to act as residuary devise, 
exactly as the personal representative acknowledged in his Post Trial Brief. See Barbara's 
Brief at 20-21. Otherwise, Barbara could have received lapsed devises as Louis' sole heir 
up to $50,000 and as a joint heir thereafter. Barbara's Brief at 21-22. Barbara inheriting 
assets not distributed in Louis' will is contrary to the words Louis actually used in his 
Will. Trial Exh. 4 at 1. Similarly, Louis intent regarding Barbara's rights, that they 
precede any other beneficiary, also supports this analysis. See discussion supra at 7-10. 
In contrast, the Children rely on Comment c to Section 5.1 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Property. Id. at 15. Barbara has previously addressed this issue. Barbara' Brief 
at 19-23. 
As noted, the Children need the Court to rewrite paragraph five of the Antenuptial 
Agreement (adding the word "marital") and to rewrite Louis' Will (adding the word 
"separate"). Children's Brief at 15,28-30. While the meaning of the Antenuptial 
Agreement is relevant, it is Louis' overall purpose in his Will in incorporating the 
Antenuptial Agreement by reference that controls. The Children have not provided any 
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logical reason that Louis' overall purpose was to treat them as general devisees, while 
Barbara's analysis has established that Louis intended his children, as the recipients of "all 
my property," to be Louis' residuary devisees. Thus, the Court should reverse the trial 
court's legal conclusion that the devise to the Children is a general devise. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER THE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY 
RETURNED TO THE ESTATE. 
Barbara attaches the current property tax report for the two parcels that comprise 
the homestead. See www.assessor.slco.org (Salt Lake County Assessor) for two parcels 
with tax identification number 2215103005 and 2215103006; Trial Exh. 21 (Deed of 
Distribution, showing tax identification numbers for the two parcels comprising the 
homestead). Barbara attaches a copy of each report as Exhibit A to this Brief. 
These two parcels have a property value of $961,330 for the land, and $193,370 for 
the home and other structures. Thus, the total property tax value of the property that 
Barbara wants to recover and sell to pay her devise is $1,154,700. 
The Children assert four legal theories for affirming the trial court's decision to 
refuse recovery of the homestead. None of those theories challenge Barbara's analysis 
directly. Instead, the Children claim first that Barbara's possessory interest in the 
homestead precludes a sale of the homestead to pay Barbara's devise. Id. at 18-19. 
Second, they assert that Barbara's original appeal of the September 27, 2003 Minute Entry 
was untimely. Id. at 19-24. Next, they argue that any motion that Barbara would file now 
is time barred. Id. at 24-25. Finally, they argue that the trial court did not have in 
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personam jurisdiction over the Children at the time of the Court's decision on the 
September 27, 2003. Id, at 26-27. None of these arguments have merit 
The trial court ruled that Barbara's motion was procedurally defective because: (i) 
it was not a "proceeding" against the Children; and (ii) Barbara's identification of herself 
as a creditor rather than a devisee did not give the Children notice of Barbara's claim that 
she wanted the property returned. Trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
at6,H6;R.1755. 
The trial court's reasons and the Children's arguments are logically barred by the 
prior appeal. Barbara specifically appealed the September 27, 2003 Order (R. 1366-67), 
and the Court of Appeals, after having determined that Barbara could not proceed as a 
creditor, nonetheless vacated and remanded to the trial court with directions to reconsider 
Barbara's motion after the trial court determined the amount to which Barbara was entitled 
as a devisee under Louis' Will. Uzelac, supra at ^ [20-21. The trial court and Children 
find Barbara's motion defective, when the Court of Appeals impliedly found it was not. 
While the Children did not need to intervene in these proceedings,8 their 
intervention does highlight one crucial point: As intervenors, the Children must take the 
case as they find it at the time of intervention. Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 285 
8
 They that had already participated in their capacity as "interested persons" in 
different matters without intervention. R. 874-75; R.1243-1255. Utah Code §75-3-105. 
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(Utah 1982). Thus, any claim that was or could have been resolved in the first appeal may 
not be raised by the Children now. 
A. Barbara's Possessory Interest Can Be Reclaimed at Any Time. 
Under Utah law, the property devised to a devisee "devolves" to the devisee 
immediately upon the decedent's death, but it does so "subject to administration'' Utah 
Code §75-3-701; Miter of Estate ofWagley, 760 P.2d 316, 317 (Utah 1988). The effect 
of this provision is that there is no immediate possessory interest in any beneficiary, and 
beneficiaries have only a limited right to keep possession of estate assets that are in their 
possession at the time of the decedent's death. Utah Code §75-3-708. Under Section 75-
3-708, if the personal representative demands return of estate property in the possession of 
a beneficiary, it is "conclusively presumed" the personal representative needs the property 
"for purposes of administration." Id. The beneficiary must return the property.9 Were this 
not so, there would often be no way to pay creditors of the estate or handle abatement 
issues that can arise.10 Thus, while the personal representative is directed generally to 
9
 The Children also assert that Barbara obtained her life estate as a result of the 
trial Court's order in December 2001. R. 13 8-41. The Court did not order the life estate 
distributed to Barbara. It simply declared her interest was a determinable life estate and it 
itemized her responsibilities as a life tenant in possession of the estate property. See also 
Utah Code §75-3-708 (duties of personal representative to maintain estate property only 
when the personal representative has possession). 
10
 There is always abatement to some extent. Any expenses paid will deprive the 
beneficiaries of the assets used to pay those expenses. A general devise will cause a 
residuary devise to abate. Utah Code §75-3-902(1). Because these charges normally fall 
on the residuary taker(s), the abatement generally goes unnoticed. 
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make distributions in kind, those distributions are made only "to the extent possible." 
Utah Code §75-3-906(1). In addition, the Code grants the personal representative the 
specific power to sell assets of the estate, a power that would be meaningless under the 
Children's view of Utah probate law. Utah Code §75-3-714(6). 
1. Bob Jones' Property Would be Sold. 
Contrary to the Children's conclusion, their "Bob Jones" example would lead to the 
sale of the property in which Bob Jones had a life estate. Children's Brief at 19. If the 
will had a general devise to another devisee ("D") charged to specific property, if the 
specific property has been lost or dissipated, if there is only one parcel of property in the 
estate (with Bob Jones' life estate), and if D requests that the property be sold to pay D's 
devise, a prudent personal representative would sell the property because the personal 
representative has a duty to follow the provisions of the probate code, has a duty of loyalty 
and impartiality to the devisees, and cannot favor one devisee over another. Utah Code 
§75-3-703; §75-7-802; §75-7-803.n 
As explained below, the prudent personal representative in selling the property 
would respect Bob Jones' rights as the life tenant. However, when the personal 
representative discovers that the devise to D cannot otherwise be paid, the Personal 
11
 In the "Bob Jones" example, the Children did not discuss how the remainder 
interests devolved to them. The remainder (R) cannot receive the property through a 
specific devise. In that event both Bob Jones' life estate and R's remainder interest 
would be specific devises and those would not abate. Utah Code §75-3-902(1 )(d). 
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Representative proceeds to take whatever steps are necessary to sell the property. Utah 
Code §75-3-703; §75-7-802; §75-7-803; §75-3-714(6). 
2. What Happens when Bob Jones is Not in Possession. 
If Bob Jones is not in possession of the property, and if no deed of distribution has 
been executed, the personal representative would sell the property. The personal 
representative would pay the value of the life estate to the life tenant without reduction 
because the life tenant is a specific devisee. See Barbara's Damage Memorandum on 
remand at 15-17; R. 1638-40 (explaining how this is done using methodology developed by 
the Internal Revenue Service). The balance of the sales proceeds would be used to pay 
D's general devise and then R's interest. Abatement of D's devise would be handled 
according to the provisions of Section 75-3-902 as required under the circumstances. Utah 
Code §75-3-902(1). 
3. What Happens if Bob Jones Is In Possession. 
If Bob Jones were in possession of the property, the personal representative would 
request that possession be returned to the estate. As noted above, Bob Jones must comply. 
Utah Code §75-3-708. If he complies, the personal representative would then proceed to 
sell the property as provided above. If Bob Jones refused to return possession to the 
personal representative, the personal representative would move the probate court to order 
Bob Jones to deliver possession to the personal representative, and the probate court would 
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proceed as outlined above. 
4. What Happens if the Property Has Been Distributed, 
If a deed of distribution had been executed in favor of Bob Jones and R, the 
personal ivpivseiihln i n mild i n n> n lln; ptopiTh usinji tin |inv • i uiaiiilnl in Sot tin mi i 
75-3-105, 75-3-909, and 75-3-1004. Once recovered, the personal representative would 
proceed as outlined above. 
5. Conclusion 
\\ hill Ihr ChiMivn ask (lit I mill In ulln lis i milnil pinbiilc U\\\ so I III ill R.ii'biiiii ilnno • 
will be denied any benefit from her devise. In their view, the personal representative may 
fight one devisee for the benefit of another, favored devisee, use the non-favored devisee's 
devise to fund the fight, and then advise the non-favored devisee, "we had to use your 
de\ ise to pay for the litigation against] • c i J " » 
contrary to the personal representative's duty to administer a probated will according to its 
terms and "in accordance with the provisions of the probate code." Utah Code §75-3-
'II ill! Il I Weortijinj'h , lln: ( 'mill 'ihoiihl n \\ 11 Ilu1 I "hililicii s Jiii'iniient, • '. . . 
B. Barbara Is Not Barred from Recovery of the Distributed Property by 
Either Section 75-3-412 or by this Court's Decision in Matter of Estate of 
Morrison. 
11 le Children argue that an adjudication of any separate probate proceeding is a 
I mi 11 ill ii'iilri I oi i|piii| ,isr> til a|)]H .ill f i iunj.1 upon Si clnin "J \ \ II II " iiill lln probate < IMII 
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Children's Brief at 20-22. However, Section 75-3-412 only applies to "a formal testacy 
order under this part — " Utah Code §75-3-412 (emphasis added). Part 4 of Chapter 3, 
comprising Sections 75-3-401 through 75-3-414, applies to "Formal Testacy and 
Appointment Proceedings." Utah Code, Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 4. None of the orders 
entered that are in dispute were entered under the provisions of Part 4. Barbara has never 
contested Louis' will; rather, she relies on it for her relief in this matter. 
Beyond this, the Children argue that the September 27, 2003 minute entry was a 
final appealable order relying on this Court's decision in Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 
1015, 1017-18, 311 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah App. 1997). In Morrison, this Court stated 
that Utah Courts have adopted a "pragmatic, case-by-case approach to [determining] 
finality in probate matters." Id. at 1017-18. Under this rule, Utah appellate courts will 
treat certain non-final, interim probate court orders as final for appellate purposes, //the 
matter is of "vital importance," "removed a cloud of uncertainty," or "effectively end[ed 
the case absent an appeal]." Id. at 1017. This rule makes sense when the issue before the 
Court is whether or not to accept for appeal a non-final order12 based on the "case by case" 
approach. If the Court decides the case does not have one of these factors, the appeal is 
dismissed and the parties continue the case below. 
12
 If the appealed order were truly a final order, it would be appealable regardless 
of its importance, etc. 
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interim orders as part of an appeal of a final order would be exceptionally unfair and 
unworkable. To use a "case by case" approach to deny appeals of interim orders as part of 
an appeal < ,i a final order would make probate appeals dangerous and unjust, rhis case is 
iilllnisliiiillii I en i luvi pi ii M !Ni lln (ii.iill 111 MM . nii i l ln1, Ilk In null i I HI in it i i i i lc/ in! ,11 signed nath th 
entry that the Children believe falls within the Morrison criteria. I o deny the right of 
appeal based on the appellate court's later conclusion that the interim order had "vital 
importance,' created "clouds of uncertainty, etc would be unfair and. unjust.' Here, the 
("null vuiiild In1 tlni\ttn,» .in jpik'.il ol ,111 iiiluini oitki Hit liiiill court (ilkd" "MinuteEntry" 
entered ten days prior to trial. 
Moreover, the Children's proposal would create an administrative nightmare. 
Conscientious attorneys in probate cases, aware of the risk of being second guesseu 
ii i lpoi tance etc of an inter im :)i der. woi ilci file an appeal for each adverse interim • 
decision. Since there in no procedure for a "notice of intent to appeal" as used in the past, 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1039 Fn.4 (Utah 1989) (discussing former 
I'! uk ' 'lih ol Ilk1 I IK< I"! tat In .ipptiil ^oukl Ik litalal a\ ji) <ippr;il i m ill ill .in Ii iliiiit us lilt 
reviewing appellate court decided the order would not be deemed final. Absent a 
summary disposition, a decision to dismiss the appeal would happen after briefing and 
probably after oral argument. 
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For these reasons, the Children's argument is unjust and impracticable, and it 
should be rejected.13 
C. Barbara is Not Seeking to File a New Motion; the Motion she did File is 
Timely. 
The Children misstate Barbara's argument by stating Barbara is claiming that "she 
was never was required" to file a proceeding against the Children. Children's Brief at 19. 
Barbara instead argued that the motion she did file was a proceeding against the Children. 
Barbara's Brief at 13-17. With that false predicate, the Children argue any motion that 
Barbara might file now would be time barred. Children's Brief at 24-25. That assertion is 
actually false. The reasons given by the trial court and the Children for denying Barbara's 
pending motion are not substantive. Thus, if Barbara's motion were dismissed on 
procedural grounds, as an "independent proceeding" under Section 75-3-106, Barbara 
would have one year to re-file an independent proceeding for recovery of the homestead. 
Utah Code §78-12-40. 
But Barbara is not seeking to file a new motion to recover the distributed property. 
The distribution occurred on May 29, 2003 (Trial Exh. 21), and Barbara filed her timely 
motion two months later on July 28, 2003. R.918-41; Utah Code §75-3-909, §75-3-1004, 
13
 Barbara's counsel faced this argument in a prior case. See Appellee's Brief in 
Hughes v. Cafferty, 89 P.3d 148, 495 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2004 UT 22 (Utah 2004). The 
Supreme Court did not need to reach this issue and so it provided no guidance. Even if a 
decision on this point is dicta, Barbara's counsel believes it would be helpful dicta for 
both the appellate courts and appellate counsel. 
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defective, not that it was untimely. It erroneously held that Barbara's motion was filed 
against the Estate, and not against the distributees. R.1755, ^|6; Barbara's Brief at 13-17. 
Barbara s motion prayed that the Children be ordered to return the homestead to the estate. 
I i n ' i i c l i o i i \\\v loi Iht l i c t i d i l ol lite rs lah nol i i j ' i i in I ml \ . R.nrkini lliii p i f H o i i II1, 
explained, she followed the correct procedure. Id. 
The trial court further held Barbara's motion was defective because she only 
identified herself as a creditor, and not as both a creditor and a devisee, ruling that '••..' 
identify ingherself .is <i < ivdiloi ilnl nol pio\ u\v "noln c lo Ilk1 Ixiielkiaries ol \w\ i liiim 
R. 1755, Tf6. The Children did not address this issue, although it would seem to be a 
necessary prerequisite to their claims that a new motion would be untimely. See 
CI lildi en's Brief at 18 29 I nt aixy e\ eiit, Barbara has already addressed this issue in her 
Appellant's Brief. Barbara's Brief ;il Ii» I . 
D. The Trial Court Had in Rem Jurisdiction of the Homestead and in 
Personam Jurisdiction over the Children. 
Ill her appellant' s brief, Barbara has identified the probate code sections that permit 
"interestedpersons'' lo ciisc ;HIII ronU'sl m;ilkT< m .i |iiol>'ili pn i reding In giunjj noln i 
to other "interested persons." Barbara's Brief at 13-17. In the face of this analysis, the 
Children claim, based solely on their status as residents of Nevada, the trial court lacked in 
personam iniisilu'lhrii win n il » onsulcicd Barbara' s motion for recovery of the distributed 
property. The Children are wrong on two coi ints I :' Ii sill: pi obate coi ii ts hai - e "in i c m' ' 
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jurisdiction of real property located in Utah. Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, 17 
Utah 2d 88, 89-90,404 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah 1965); accord Uniform Probate Code §3-101 
(General Comment; preceding section). Accordingly, the probate court had jurisdiction to 
order the title to the homestead returned to the estate. Without in personam jurisdiction 
the Court could quiet title in the estate if necessary. Thus, the trial court did not need in 
personam jurisdiction. 
In any event, the trial court had in personam jurisdiction. Like all other 
jurisdictions, Utah courts gain in personam jurisdiction of any party that appears generally 
in any court proceeding. See Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1974). In 
Barber, the Supreme Court found that the filing of an answer by nonresidents constituted a 
general appearance, noting "an appearance by the defendant for any purpose except. . . to 
object to jurisdiction . . . constitutes a general appearance." Id. at 702, Fn. 4. Having 
appeared generally, the Children voluntarily submitted themselves to the trial court's in 
personam jurisdiction. Thus, the Children remain subject to the in personam jurisdiction 
of the trial court and this Court. 
Barbara asks the Court to order the homestead returned to the Estate. 
THE CHILDREN'S CROSS APPEAL 
V. THE COURT SHOULD DENY THE CHILDREN'S CROSS APPEAL FOR 
FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE FACTS AND ON THE MERITS. 
The Children identify their cross appeal issue as "Did the trial court correctly 
calculate [the amount of Barbara's devise]" and their burden regarding the trial court's 
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arguments: the court failed to include a deduction in its computation; and the Court 
improperly calculated what assets were held at death14 They did not marshal the facts and 
demonsti ate that those facts "cannot possibly support the conclusion reached by the trial 
court t'\rn WVP * H'wrd n» 'li», Ip'lil most LntoHc It" (In1 .ippclltv" H i\ nn,fif i '/-'Mi/frf, 
1f9, 144 P.3d 114;, 561 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 2006 UT 56 (Utah 2006). Nor did they follow 
the procedure outlined in Chen v. Stewart even though they cited it regarding their burden 
on appeal. < lien v Sternal 1fl| u Kil Il I I! Il I Il II II / .11 'I Il K a l i / " W l \ K c p "K " " D I M ! I I II K J 
.(Utah 2004) (explaining in detail marshaling, if \ purpose and what the court, expects when 
a party marshals the facts). In addition, their Remand Brief did not include the allegedly 
missing item when the Children discussed offsets. Children's Remand Brief at 8, R. 1566. 
l ied • : ' 
When the Children address their cross appeal (Children's Brief at 16-18), they 
argue for the first time that the trial court did not follow the directions of the Court of 
Appeals because the POD accounts owned by Louis were not "held at death." Children's 
Brief Jill Id I H Ml Il i nil«, v> llln fin in in I nun i ml Inn (limr In si liiiiir MM .ipptai, il r < otiltan In 
their Remand Brief. "POD accounts are . . . non-probate assets.. . . Ownership transferred 
upon Lou's death." Children's Remand Brief at 9; R. 1586, }^1. Having conceded that 
14
 While it should not be relevant to this appeal, the Children falsely claim that 
Barbara received all of the tangible personal property listed on Trial Exh 36 Compare 
Children's Brief at 12 with T 101-105 
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Louis held the assets at death, the Children may not now argue his ownership terminated 
"immediately before death." See also R. 1366-67, TJ21 (trial court's initial finding Louis 
held eight accounts at death, including the POD accounts); see also, Trial Exhibit 2, 
Stipulation at 3-4,19. 
In any event, the Children's position is legally incorrect. In support of their 
argument, the Children cite Section 75-2-205, a probate code section that only applies to 
the elective share provisions. Utah Code §75-2-201 (definitions "as used in this part"); 
Utah Code Title 75, Chapter 2, Part 2 "Elective Share of Surviving Spouse." 
The controlling statutory provisions are contained in Sections 75-6-101 through 115 
"Multiple Party Accounts." Those sections specifically address the rights of parties and 
POD payees to "POD accounts". POD accounts are owned by the "party" or owner 
(Louis) until death. The POD payee only obtains ownership by proving the fact of the 
owner's death and the POD payee's identity. Utah Code §75-6-110. See also Utah Code 
§75-6-101 (7)(a), (7)(b), (9), (10), and (11). Section 75-6-104(1), cited by the Children 
addressing "joint accounts" not POD accounts, actually supports Barbara's point. Utah 
Code §75-6-104(1). A dispute between an estate and a surviving joint tenant cannot arise 
until the decedent has died. It does not arise "immediately before death." 
For these reasons, the Court should not modify or reverse the trial court's 
calculation of damages. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Intent on keeping their unjust enrichment, the Children rely on pejorative comments 
about Barbara in support of that goal. That should not be surprising to counsel or to the 
Court. Barbara, friend of I ,ouis for nearly 50 y e a r s , l o v i n g w i f e for o v e r 2 3 y e a r s , 
in in iiuiith c i i ' hh nine U M T S oil ,U.H, d o r s IIIHHI! iindcrsljinil v\\\\ I  n i ih intni i t lol I'lllil In In i 
had to pass through this gauntlet of irrelevant, unexplained, false, and misleading 
statements of fact. Having not responded to each and every allegation as she would have 
liked to ha\ e clone, Barbara asks the Coi n 1: to render a fair and just decision based on the 
legal issues invoh eel 
Accordingly, Barbara asks the Court to remedy seven years of injustice by: 
• 1. Ordering the homestead to be reconveyed to the estate; 
" ••' • . 2. Ordei ing the homestead sold; •• . •• • • • • '• 
3. Ordering Barbara's life estate interest to be valued fairly, takiri: ;. 
when the personal representative should have sold the life estate; 
4. Ordering the net proceeds of sale distributed to Barbara for her life estate 
5. Holding that Barbara is a general pecuniary devisee, entitled to interest as 
directed by Section 75-3-904; and •. 
6. Holding that the Children are residuary devisees whose devise abates to pay 
Barbara's general peci it liaiy de \ ise pi u: si lant tc Section 75 3- 9 0 2 . •' 
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Dated this/ 2-day of March, 2007. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Charles M. Benftett 
Attorneys for Barbara Uzelac 
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